Los que llevamos unos cuantos años utilizando ordenadores hemos visto pasar por nuestras manos todo tipo de puertos. Hasta la introducción y estandarización del USB, muchos de los dispositivos que utilizábamos tenían conectores diferentes, y algunos hasta propietarios. Vamos a recordar algunos de ellos. » Alberto García | adslzone.net
IBM era el dueño y señor de los bits y los bytes a principios de los 80. En aquella época Apple, Microsoft y los fabricantes de aquellos legendarios ordenadores de 8 bits también despuntaban, pero todo daba igual: el gigante azul dominaba con mano firme la informática empresarial, y para muestra un botón: el PC no se llamaba PC. Se llamaba IBM PC. » Javier Pastor | xataka.com
We demonstrate the extraction of secret decryption keys from laptop computers, by nonintrusively measuring electromagnetic emanations for a few seconds from a distance of 50 cm. The attack can be executed using cheap and readily-available equipment: a consumer-grade radio receiver or a Software Defined Radio USB dongle. The setup is compact and can operate untethered; it can be easily concealed, e.g., inside pita bread. Common laptops, and popular implementations of RSA and ElGamal encryptions, are vulnerable to this attack, including those that implement the decryption using modern exponentiation algorithms such as sliding-window, or even its side-channel resistant variant, fixed-window (m-ary) exponentiation. We successfully extracted keys from laptops of various models running GnuPG (popular open source encryption software, implementing the OpenPGP standard), within a few seconds. The attack sends a few carefully-crafted ciphertexts, and when these are decrypted by the target computer, they trigger the occurrence of specially-structured values inside the decryption software. These special values cause observable fluctuations in the electromagnetic field surrounding the laptop, in a way that depends on the pattern of key bits (specifically, the key-bits window in the exponentiation routine). The secret key can be deduced from these fluctuations, through signal processing and cryptanalysis. ...
You don’t often see clever builds like this Technic Dot Matrix Display by AncientJames from New Zealand. As the reel starts rolling, the patterns on the cards inside correspond with the patterns on the display and can show anything that fits into a 5x5 square. The creator’s video is titled, “Everything is awesome”. Well, this build certainly is! » Gergo Vas | kotaku.com
El 19 de abril de 1965, Gordon Earle Moore publicaba una editorial en la revista Electronics que cambió el cómo entendíamos la tecnología. En ella aseguraba que la complejidad de los circuitos integrados se duplicaría cada año (luego se modificó para fijar el periodo de dos años), a la vez que los precios y costes de fabricación se verían reducidos. Cincuenta años después conocemos esta afirmación como la Ley de Moore, un exponente de la tecnología que se ha ido cumpliendo generación tras generación, pero con muchas dudas al respecto. ...
A complete simulation of the 6502 processor (used in the Commodore 64, Apple ][ and the NES). » visual6502.org
Security researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel have found a way to retrieve data from an air-gapped computer using only heat emissions and a computer’s built-in thermal sensors. The method would allow attackers to surreptitiously siphon passwords or security keys from a protected system and transmit the data to an internet-connected system that’s in close proximity and that the attackers control. They could also use the internet-connected system to send malicious commands to the air-gapped system using the same heat and sensor technique. The proof-of-concept attack requires both systems to first be compromised with malware. And currently, the attack allows for just eight bits of data to be reliably transmitted over an hour—a rate that is sufficient for an attacker to transmit brief commands or siphon a password or secret key but not large amounts of data. It also works only if the air-gapped system is within 40 centimeters (about 15 inches) from the other computer the attackers control. But the researchers, at Ben Gurion’s Cyber Security Labs, note that this latter scenario is not uncommon, because air-gapped systems often sit on desktops alongside Internet-connected ones so that workers can easily access both. ...
“Rowhammer” is a problem with some recent DRAM devices in which repeatedly accessing a row of memory can cause bit flips in adjacent rows. We tested a selection of laptops and found that a subset of them exhibited the problem. We built two working privilege escalation exploits that use this effect. One exploit uses rowhammer-induced bit flips to gain kernel privileges on x86-64 Linux when run as an unprivileged userland process. When run on a machine vulnerable to the rowhammer problem, the process was able to induce bit flips in page table entries (PTEs). It was able to use this to gain write access to its own page table, and hence gain read-write access to all of physical memory. ...
The U.S. National Security Agency has figured out how to hide spying software deep within hard drives made by Western Digital, Seagate, Toshiba, and other top manufacturers, giving the agency the means to eavesdrop on the majority of the world’s computers, according to cyber researchers and former operatives. » Joseph Menn | businessinsider.com
En 1972 se ponía en venta en las tiendas norteamericanas la Magnavox Odyssey, la primera videoconsola de la historia. Un año antes un estudiante de la Universidad de Stanford y su socio habían construido la primera máquina recreativa de la historia. A partir de estos dos acontecimientos clave los videojuegos comenzaron a popularizarse creando a día de hoy una gigantesca industria de ocio y entretenimiento capaz de competir en seguidores y volumen de ventas con el cine o la música. ...